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Abstract
The problem of tax avoidance in the European Union (EU) has existed since the beginning of the EU internal 
market and is an important aspect at both the national and international levels. Among the most important 
reasons for this phenomenon are the inconsistent regulations and solutions applied in the tax systems of indi-
vidual countries, the diverse and complicated nature of financial instruments and structures, the insufficient 
cooperation of tax administrations in EU countries or harmful tax competition. This state of affairs causes 
negative consequences for the budgets of individual countries and discriminates against honest taxpayers, 
because tax profits derived from tax evasion are invested in a competitive struggle against companies that 
reliably settle accounts with the tax authorities. The construction of an efficient and effective, yet fully fair 
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tax system in the EU is intended to eliminate or significantly reduce the problem of tax avoidance. This is 
achieved by the measures currently underway (e.g. the introduction of a directive against tax avoidance 
or the elaboration by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) regarding 
the recommendations for local administrations in the field of national tax regulations). This article aims to 
highlight the importance of the tax avoidance problem and to present selected actions to solve it at both 
the national and EU levels. The structure of the study has been subordinated to the above, as along with 
the applied research method, including the analytical and conceptual approach.
Introduction
The problem of tax avoidance in the European Union (EU) has existed since the 
beginning of the EU internal market and is an important aspect at both the national 
and international levels. Among the most important reasons for this phenomenon are 
the inconsistent regulations and solutions applied in the tax systems of individual 
countries, the diverse and complicated nature of financial instruments and structures, 
the insufficient cooperation of tax administrations in EU countries or harmful tax 
competition. This state of affairs causes negative consequences for the budgets of 
individual countries and discriminates against honest taxpayers, because tax profits 
derived from tax evasion are invested in a competitive struggle against companies that 
reliably settle accounts with the tax authorities. The construction of an efficient and 
effective, yet fully fair, tax system in the EU is intended to eliminate or significantly 
reduce the problem of tax avoidance. This is achieved by the measures currently 
underway (e.g. the introduction of a directive against tax avoidance or the elaboration 
by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) regarding 
the recommendations for local administrations in the field of national tax regulations). 
This article aims to highlight the importance of the tax avoidance problem and to 
present selected actions to solve it at both the national and EU levels. The structure 
of the study has been subordinated to the above, as along with the applied research 
method, including the analytical and conceptual approach.
Definition of “tax avoidance” and “aggressive tax planning”
Tax avoidance is a natural effect of the public authorities’ interference in proper-
ty relations. This activity is almost certainly as old as the tax institution itself. From 
the very beginning, market participants sought ways to minimise tax liabilities and 
public authorities tried to limit this practice. Tax avoidance is a global problem and 
international steps are needed to overcome it. This is why many activities are under-
taken, e.g. by OECD or European Commission (EC) authorities. These actions are 
primarily aimed at improving instruments to combat tax fraud and implementing new 
tools to achieve this goal. Considering the importance of this phenomenon, the focus 
should be on the definition of the key concept in the context of the discussed topic.
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Attempts to define the concept of tax avoidance today can cause many difficulties. 
This is a multifaceted notion that should be examined not only from the legal, but also 
from the economic, social and even philosophical perspective. From a legal point of 
view, the phenomenon of tax avoidance is closely related to a particular tax system, 
because its legality or illegality depends on the legal norms issued by an individual 
state authority. Since different legal systems are in force in individual countries, it 
is impossible to create a general definition of tax avoidance based on the provisions 
of tax law. In Poland, in the Tax Ordinance Act (Polish Tax Ordinance Act of 29 
August 1997, Art. 119a § 1), tax avoidance is described as an act performed primarily 
to obtain a tax advantage, which means other motives are irrelevant. Moreover, the 
activity is contrary to the essence and purpose of the tax act.
The definition by HM Revenue and Customs can also be cited as an example. 
According to this organisation, tax avoidance is an activity that
(…) involves bending the rules of the tax system to gain a tax advantage that Parliament 
never intended. It often involves contrived, artificial transactions that serve little or no pur-
pose other than to produce this advantage. It involves operating within the letter – but not the 
spirit – of the law. Most tax avoidance schemes simply do not work, and those who engage 
in it can find they pay more than the tax they attempted to save once HMRC has successfully 
challenged them (HM Treasury, HM Revenue & Customs, 2015, p. 5). 
Even the OECD states “avoidance” in the glossary as a term difficult to define, 
equally stating that it is “used to describe the arrangement of a taxpayer’s affairs 
that is intended to reduce his tax liability and that although the arrangement could 
be strictly legal it is usually in contradiction with the intent of the law it purports to 
follow” (OECD, 2007). Consequently, the most characteristic aspects of tax avoid-
ance are the usage of legal methods to fulfil the purpose, i.e. minimising taxes and 
contradicting the purpose and essence of the tax act.
Regarding tax planning, based on the OECD’s glossary (OECD, 2007), it is de-
scribed as an arrangement of a person’s business and/or private affairs to minimise 
tax liability. However, the widely analysed phenomenon is currently aggressive tax 
planning. As has been defined by the EC in its 2012 Recommendation, aggressive 
tax planning consists of taking advantage of technicalities in a tax system or mis-
matches between two or more tax systems for the purpose of reducing tax liability. 
In effect, aggressive tax planning abuses the differences in individual tax systems. 
Holding companies or conduit companies may be used by international firms to 
extract a country tax treaty network or low tax jurisdictions to reduce their tax li-
ability (e.g. redirecting the income obtained in one country or taking advantage of 
exemptions or deductions assigned to holding structures) (Mosquera, Akunobera, 
Mazz, Quiñones Cruz, Schoueri, Roeleveld, West, Pistone, & Zimmer, 2018, p. 
150). Furthermore, on 21 June 2017, the EC published a proposal for amending the 
directive on administrative cooperation in the field of taxation (Directive 2011/16/
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EU) and listed “hallmarks” (strong indicators of tax avoidance or abuse) in an an-
nex to the proposal. For instance, as hallmarks were specified, arrangements were 
made concerning the following: the use of losses, the conversion of income into 
a lower-taxed category of revenue, and deductible cross-border payments that take 
advantage of a preferential tax regime at the recipient level where the recipient is 
a resident in a jurisdiction that imposes corporation tax at less than half the average 
rate in the EU or in a jurisdiction included on the EU tax haven blacklist.
The causes of tax avoidance
Regarding the reasons for the occurrence of the tax avoidance phenomenon, they 
are based on striving to offset or completely reduce the tax burden by natural persons 
and legal persons. This is caused by the use of too high tax rates by individual countries. 
Thus, taxpayers are looking for the possibility of minimising the depletion of their 
income because of taxes. Today, the largest income is generated by economic entities. 
Therefore, one important reason for tax avoidance is the negative impact of taxes on 
the economy. The negative aspect of the tax law impact on the economy is mainly 
due to the increase in the tax burden. This leads to the limitation of the development 
of economic entities, because the payment of an increasingly higher tax reduces their 
monetary resources. Due to the lack of sufficient financial resources, the entrepreneur 
can not only invest, but also often loses current financial liquidity. The logical conse-
quence of this is the loss of competitiveness on the market, which in effect compels 
a specific economic entity to withdraw from business. Adam Smith, an eighteenth-cen-
tury Scottish thinker and economist, claimed that “too high tax burden drains the farm, 
i.e. dries out the source that lives off” (Smith, 1954, pp. 584–587). A well-known 
American specialist in economics, chief adviser in the economic policy of President 
Ronald Reagan, Arthur B. Laffer, came to similar conclusions. This economist became 
famous primarily for the concept of the so-called “optimal tax rate” (Laffer, 2004). 
This theory assumes that there is a relationship between the amount of the tax rate 
and the amount of tax revenues to the state budget. Laffer believed that the increase 
in the tax rate triggers two opposite effects. The first of these is to increase the share 
of the state budget in the income of business entities, and the second is to reduce the 
taxpayers’ income declared for taxation. This is because, as the tax rate increases, the 
economic motivation to take up work and business decreases. However, the tendency 
of business entities to hide their income and enter the “grey zone” increases. This is the 
reason for the increase in unemployment and the deterioration of investment conditions. 
Therefore, when imposing taxes, the state should strive to obtain an optimal tax rate. 
It is determined by the “saturation point” in which tax receipts reach their amplitude. 
This point, above which the amount of tax revenue begins to decrease, determines the 
Laffer curve. However, this phenomenon is purely theoretical, and in practice, both 
the determination of this point and the remaining course of the curve are unknown. It 
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is not enough to set the appropriate tax rates to determine it. What is also needed here 
is a thorough economic analysis of the market.
The reasons for international tax avoidance are also mentioned in the multitude, 
intricacy and structural complexity of tax optimisation instruments. However, it 
should be remembered that the tax strategies of international holdings are constructed 
on the basis of several tax jurisdictions simultaneously: domestic legislation, where 
holding structures operate (there may be several to several dozen – depending on 
the holding structure), European tax law and international tax law. One should be 
aware of the breadth of the entire tax jurisdiction on the grounds of which the in-
ternational holding is building its strategy. The international tax law itself means 
hundreds of international agreements that are effectively used by holding companies 
to avoid taxation. The scope of this problem is usually beyond the possibilities of 
tax control. The essence of international tax avoidance is complicated by unfair tax 
competition between member states. This is a phenomenon that has permanently 
entered the economic realities of the EU. Member States, which should act jointly 
and severally against international tax avoidance (or at least not disturb each other), 
have begun to compete with each other in tax solutions dedicated to international 
holding companies. By proposing the most beneficial solutions, countries want to 
encourage international holding companies to locate their activities and pay taxes 
in their territory, even if taxes are much lower than expected, but still satisfying. 
Member States are aware that they will not stop the trend of optimising taxation; 
therefore, they have begun promoting their own tax systems as the most beneficial, 
and certainly more beneficial than the solutions proposed by neighbouring Member 
States. Such a policy of unfair tax competition has become a fact and debunks the 
idea of common tax compliance. A classic example of this is the LuxLeaks scandal.
The scale of the phenomenon in EU countries
International tax avoidance under the corporate income tax (CIT) has become 
a global trend, which has now reached such a level that it truly threatens not only budg-
etary interests, but also their security. This is reflected in the losses due to international 
avoidance of CIT in Poland, which have reached PLN 46 billion annually (Gajewski, 
2015, pp. 9–21). The scale of the phenomenon allows us to state clearly that the problem 
has been growing for a long time and it can be assumed that the relevant services either 
underestimated it, did not see it, or did not have the idea of effectively counteracting this 
phenomenon. In addition, the scale of the problem was proved by successive scandals: 
Panama Papers, Offshore Leaks, Swiss Leaks or the aforementioned LuxLeaks. This 
resulted in a clear disclosure of the weaknesses of the control system regarding the 
issue of transferring profits between individual companies within the holding.
There are significant reasons for difficulties in estimating the amount of tax 
avoidance in an economy. The first and the most obvious is that there is no strict 
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legal definition of what tax avoidance is and, therefore, any estimate will always be 
subject to dispute by those who simply disagree on definitional issues as to what is 
and what is not tax avoidance. Second, a great deal of tax avoidance activity involves 
cross-border transactions. It is, therefore, notoriously difficult to determine where 
tax avoidance might take place, even if it is known that it is occurring. Third, even 
official estimates – such as those by the US Internal Revenue Service published in 
January 2012, tend to ignore the issue. The word “avoidance” is not mentioned in 
their report (Internal Revenue Service, 2012). The Swedish National Tax Agency 
has not avoided this issue, but it is all too aware of the problems of preparing any 
estimates, stating in its 2008 report The Tax Gap Map for Sweden (Swedish National 
Tax Agency, 2008): “The uncertainty is considered greatest with regard to the tax 
gap with international connections and the tax gap for large companies, where there 
is a not insignificant amount of tax avoidance. In addition to the difficulty of calcu-
lating the size of the gap that exists, it is in many respects difficult to decide what 
a tax gap is”. This leaves a very limited number of reports to look at and make any 
suggestions regarding the scope of tax avoidance in the EU.
There are many different estimates and reports on the scale of tax avoidance in 
general and for specific companies. They were developed by tax administrations, 
non-governmental organisations, academia and the press. However, there are no 
reliable figures on the scale of tax avoidance by enterprises, although it is generally 
recognised that these are significant values (some of the highest estimates indicate 
an amount of EUR 860 billion per year due to tax evasion1 and 150 billion per year 
due to tax avoidance) (Murphy, 2012, p. 2).
The effects of tax avoidance
The legitimate activities of the taxpayer, which are not aimed at achieving any 
economic result, and their only goal is to achieve tax benefits, are doubtful from 
the point of view of tax law. Doubts of a moral nature arise because the legislator, 
creating tax regulations, assumes the rationality of taxpayers’ actions in the economic 
sphere. Therefore, if the tax goal is the only determinant of the taxpayer’s actions, 
then it is possible to discuss the fictitious matching of specific situations to the most 
tax-favourable situation for the taxpayer. Behaviours contrary to the assumptions 
adopted by the tax legislator result in a higher taxation of those taxpayers who act in 
a rational manner in the sphere of social relations. The taxpayer manoeuvring with 
artificial forms of business transactions achieves undeserved benefits in relation to 
taxpayers who act in a manner adequate to the legislator’s assumptions. The general 
1  Due to the OECD glossary (OECD, 2007): “A term that is difficult to define but which is generally 
used to mean illegal arrangements where liability to tax is hidden or ignored, i.e. the taxpayer pays less tax 
than he is legally obligated to pay by hiding income or information from the tax authorities”.
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assumption adopted in the creation of tax law is that the taxpayer operates in a manner 
typical for a given type of social and especially economic relations. The operation 
of abstract and general standards makes sense only with such assumptions. Tax law 
institutions are designed for taxpayers acting in this way (Kurzac, 2017, pp. 14–15).
The negative effects of international tax avoidance are not the same for each Mem-
ber State. These effects depend on several aspects, including on the level of systemic 
security against tax optimisation instruments, the level of awareness and training of 
the tax office, which performs control activities, and finally whether the state has 
a long-term strategy dedicated to honest international holding companies (holding tax 
law) and aggressively holding companies optimising taxation. The consequences of 
international tax avoidance have a special impact on the fiscal condition of Poland.
As part of international tax avoidance, one should notice another very danger-
ous phenomenon, the so-called spoiling a good taxpayer, which can be observed 
especially in Poland. The lack of an effective strategy against international tax 
avoidance results in holding companies that engage in this practice using their 
tax savings to fight against competition (e.g. through the use of dumped prices). 
Accordingly, holding companies that do not use aggressive tax optimisation are no 
longer competitive. The long-term presence of such a situation creates a difficult 
dilemma: either lose the fight against aggressive taxation companies, which will 
result in the liquidation of activities, or also start unfairly optimising taxation. 
Holding companies are aware that they cannot count on a state that is ineffective 
in combating international tax avoidance. Simultaneously, they realise that if the 
state is ineffective in relation to holdings that use strictly defined constructions 
that aggressively optimise taxation, it will also be ineffective in relation to them if 
they adopt a similar tactic. This is undoubtedly a very dangerous phenomenon for 
the state, which somehow encourages taxpayers to use all, even the non-allowed 
methods of tax optimisation. The conclusion is also that the incapability of the state 
and the lack of systemic solutions in combating international tax avoidance results 
in an increasing number of dishonest taxpayers.
Ways to combat tax avoidance
Such a significant scale of the phenomenon and the serious negative effects 
mentioned in the previous section of the article indicate the legitimacy of taking all 
measures aimed at limiting the scale of tax avoidance in EU countries.
The first step was to be the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) 
directive. Thanks to the CCCTB, cross-border companies were to follow only one, 
single EU system for computing their taxable income rather than many different 
national rulebooks. The proposed draft directive was also intended to regulate the 
taxation of international holdings and prevent tax avoidance, but it proved to be 
a solution with numerous drawbacks that would foster aggressive tax optimisation.
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It is also noteworthy that other concepts that were intended to harmonise hold-
ing tax law and which would counteract international tax avoidance have not been 
successful:
– European Union Corporate Income Tax (EU-CIT);
– Compulsory Harmonised Single Tax Base (CHSTB);
– Home State Taxation (HST);
– spontaneous harmonisation of Member States;
– harmonisation through the “back door” of the CJEU (harmonisation as a result 
of reactions to judgments of the Court of Justice of the EU);
– harmonisation limited to selected legal issues and aimed at solving specific 
individual problems through the so-called targeted measures).
They had numerous defects and imperfections, and above all they were not of 
a comprehensive nature. Consequently, the EC decided that the CCCTB concept 
had the highest chance of success, which later turned out to be a mistake (Gajewski, 
2015, pp. 9–21).
In December 2012, the EC published a final report on actions to strengthen 
the fight against avoidance and evasion of taxes: An Action Plan to strengthen the 
fight against tax fraud and tax evasion (Communication from the Commission to 
the European Parliament and the Council, 2012). This plan presents strictly defined 
actions that should be introduced in waves. The plan brings a new value to the inter-
national discussion regarding taxation and tries to support the group of G20 and G8 
countries in joint work regarding tax issues. This was supported by the G20 Leaders’ 
Declaration of 19 June 2012 in Los Cabos: “We reiterate the need to prevent base 
erosion and profit shifting and we will follow with attention the on-going work of 
the OECD in this area” (Pasternak-Malicka, 2013, p. 60).
The fruit of cooperation was the report Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting (Action Plan on BEPS) (OECD, 2013) published in July 2013 by the OECD 
and the G20 Member States. The aim of the plan is to coordinate the actions of many 
countries against tax avoidance by enterprises with a cross-border or global structure.
The sealing of the tax system is to be served by specific activities in 15 high-
lighted areas, including:
– creating instruments to eliminate or neutralise the effects of hybrid structures;
– improving transfer pricing rules and addressing areas that generate undesirable 
effects;
– updating income taxation solutions, in particular in the field of digital products 
and services;
– introduction of tools allowing effective counteracting tax avoidance;
– introduction of provisions on the taxation of international financial transac-
tions, and
– introduction of solutions to counteract the existence of harmful tax regimes.
In connection with the OECD’s action plan, the EU authorities undertook ini-
tiatives corresponding to individual areas. The EC’s communication published on 
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17 June 2015 states that EU directives should, where appropriate, be the preferred 
tool for implementing OECD proposals at the EU level to counter tax base erosion 
and profit shifting.
EU activities corresponding to the OECD Action Plan on BEPS include:
– Anti-tax-avoidance Directive (as a part of Anti-tax Avoidance Package);
– Council Directive (EU) 2015/2376 of 8 December 2015 amending Directive 
2011/16/EU regarding the mandatory automatic exchange of information in the field 
of taxation;
– EC external strategy initiative to blacklist Third World countries based on lack 
of good tax governance principles, and
– EU Parent-Subsidiary Directive – GAAR.
To ensure the proper functioning of the internal market, it is necessary for Mem-
ber States, at least, to comply with their obligations to counter tax base erosion and 
profit shifting and, to a wider extent, take measures to discourage tax avoidance 
practices and ensure fair and effective taxation in the Union in a sufficiently uniform 
and coordinated manner (Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 laying 
down rules against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the 
internal market).
As for the examples of anti-tax avoidance solutions implemented or planned to 
be implemented in individual EU countries, horizontal monitoring in Austria can 
be mentioned. It is an innovative and progressively popular way of tax reporting in 
which the taxpayer signs a declaration obliging the company to disclose the files to 
the authorities. Both parties meet on a regular basis to discuss which tax practices 
are allowed and which are not, and after a few years, audits are no longer carried out. 
Although the start-up phase requires effort, the system provides a long-term benefit: 
both sides gain security and confidence, avoiding reluctance and related costs.
On the other hand, in Hungary, the new anti-hybrid rule in force from 2015 
sets out the principle that any differences between the legal classification of legal 
relationships that are affected by international agreements cannot result in double 
non-taxation; if so, Hungary would take into account the relevant income in the tax 
base. Moreover, in the Czech Republic on 1 July 2017, the Czech Income Tax Act 
was amended to include the limitation of tax exemptions from dividends received by 
a Czech tax resident when dividends are received from the so-called “hybrid loans”.
Conclusions
In the largest public debate on taxes and morals, and especially tax avoidance, 
in history, changes in international tax planning are inevitable. Greater control over 
international transactions carried out by tax authorities will certainly be a part of 
these changes. Many structures will no longer be allowed. Transparency will be 
the main focus for both taxpayers and collectors, and companies are expected to 
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be subject to more stringent requirements to reveal where they have paid taxes and 
how much they have paid.
A large number of EU Member States, although not all members of the OECD 
itself, have committed to implementing BEPS activities, due to their participation 
in international forums and instruments relevant to the BEPS activities. In the EU, 
there is, therefore, a need to avoid different interpretations of BEEC OECD/G20 
measures, taking into account the single market, which includes existing initiatives 
to increase tax efficiency and transparency. When implementing EU BEPS activ-
ities, a coordinated approach is crucial to avoid inconsistencies that could create 
uncertainty and administrative burdens. Jointly planned and agreed actions are the 
only way to prevent discrepancies generating new mismatches in the single market.
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